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The Court of Justice of the European Communities, through its
interpretation of the law of the European Economic Community,
greatly impacts business enterprises in Europe. Those doing
business in Europe must therefore keep abreast of the Court's
major decisions. The purpose of this comment is to provide a
survey of some of the Court's major decisions handed down in
1990 which will impact business in Europe. Although each of the
Court's decisions necessarily impacts the European business
environment, the cases selected for discussion are those considered
in 1990 that will have the most direct effect. Before beginning the
discussion of these cases, however, the introduction will provide a
brief overview of the Court itself.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ)
interprets and applies the law of the European Economic
Community Treaties (Treaties). One of the ECJ's primary
objectives is to eliminate differences that may exist between
European Economic Community (EEC or Community) law and the
national laws of the member states.' The ECJ has often given
effect to the EEC's goal to facilitate the free movement of goods,
capital and manpower among its member nations, by enforcing
Community law over national law when conflicts arise. In doing
so, the ECJ has stated that the Community provides a new legal
order in international law which requires a limited surrender of
sovereignty by the Member States, but in return creates new rights
for those States and their citizens which become part of their legal
heritage.2
1. Mahfood, The EEC: European Law in the Court of Justice, N.Y.LJ., Jan. 5, 1990, at I
[hereinafter Mahfood]. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, opened for
signature Mar. 25, 1957 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958) 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Treaty]. This
Treaty is also known as the Treaty of Rome. For an excellent discussion of the history and
development of the EEC, see generally Slynn, Aspects of the Law of the European Economic
Community, 18 CORNEL IN'T U. 1 (1985).
2. See id. (citing Case 26/62, NVAlgemene Transport-en Expeditie Orderneming van Gend
& Los v. Netherlands Fiscal Admin., [1963] Common Mkt. Rpt. (CCH) 8008).
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In its role as guardian of the Treaties, the ECJ performs both
direct and indirect judicial functions. In the context of its direct
judicial control, the ECJ has authority under the EEC Treaty both
to interpret Community law and to apply that interpretation to
specific cases brought before it. Under the Court's indirect judicial
control, National Courts of the Member States may call upon the
ECJ to interpret Community law. The ECJ's interpretation of
Community law then enables the national courts to correctly apply
that law in the context of impending national legislation and
decisions.3 The ECJ acts as the court of first and last resort when
interpreting EEC law. There are no avenues for appeal from its
decisions.4 Relief from an unfavorable decision by the ECJ is
possible only through a request for revision. This request must
show the existence of previously unknown facts or circumstances
which impact the outcome.5
Once the ECJ has issued its judgment and an order for
enforcement, the rules of civil procedure of the member state in
whose territory the judgment is to be executed govern the method
of enforcement. The courts in those Member States must assure
that the ECJ's judgments are properly carried out.6
Specific cases brought before the court fall into two categories:
Actions against Member States and actions against Community
Institutions.7 These Community Institutions are the European
Community (EC) Council and the EEC Commission. The EEC
Commission is the administrative and executive branch of the EEC,
and has the power to propose legislation to the EC Council.
However, before that legislation becomes effective, the EC Council
must approve it.8
The ECJ has exclusive jurisdiction regarding actions against
Member States arising from allegations that the Member State has
3. 0. BEBR, DEVmOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 6 (1981)
[hereinafter BEBR].
4. D. LASOK & J. BRIDGE, LAW & INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 255 (1987)
[hereinafter LASOK & BRIDGE].
5. Id.
6. K. LASOK, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 320 (1984).
7. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 258.
8. Mahfood, supra note 1.
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failed to fulfill its obligations under the EEC. Cases also arise
when there is a dispute between Member States as to the subject
matter of the Treaty. The ECJ can hear these cases by permission
of the parties to the action.9
Actions against Community Institutions generally take the form
of actions for annulment of legislation found in Regulations,
Decisions, or Directives. Under Article 173, such actions can be
brought only when the legislative act has binding effect. To have
binding effect, the legislative act must be one which will have legal
effect, and it must be a clear and final expression of the intent of
a Community Institution. ° Article 173 allows any natural or legal
person to lodge an annulment action, provided they have locus
standi (i.e. standing), which requires that they have a legal interest
in the action and be directly impacted thereby."
Because the ECJ's decisions based on EEC law have the effect
of superseding national law, the ECJ is in a uniquely powerful
position. As a multinational authority, the ECJ substantially impacts
business conduct in the Community as a whole as well as within
each individual Member State. While the ECJ is not bound by the
principle of stare decisis, its prior decisions nonetheless represent
persuasive authority which is considered in the context of the
Court's reasoning. In practice, the Court has recognized its prior
decisions as developing case law, and in its efforts to promote legal
certainty, has tended to follow those precedents.2 Recognizing the
impact of the Court's decisions in the evolving interpretation of
EEC law, those doing business with the Community as well as
those proposing to enter this broadening market must become
aware of the Court decisions that will impact the business
community in Europe. To facilitate that effort, this comment will
survey some of the ECI's major decisions handed down in 1990.
9. Id.
10. BEAR, supra note 3, at 22.
11. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 267.
12. BEBR, supra note 3, at 10.
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The cases selected for discussion address a number of topics
that most directly impact upon the European business environment
including:
(1) Clarification of EEC regulations on dumping;
(2) Preservation of competition by preventing abuse
of a dominant position;
(3) Equal employment and equal pay requirements;
and
(4) Harmonization of EEC law with that of member
states.
I. ANTIDUMPiNG DuTEs
The process of "dumping" is the sale of products for export at
prices which are lower than the product's normal value. 3 Various
motives for dumping include: (1) Maximizing of short term profits;
(2) establishing or maintaining markets; or (3) protecting full
employment. The primary motive giving rise to Community
concern, however, is predation.1 4 An exporter motivated by
predation attempts to eliminate competition in the import countries
by selling products at prices which producers in the import
countries cannot match. This elimination process creates a
monopoly power for the exporter, destroys competition, and
severely constricts the market shares enjoyed by producers in the
import countries.
To implement EEC objectives related to competition within the
Community and strength of Community business, the EC Council
can, by resolution, impose antidumping duties on companies that
engage in dumping. Because establishment of predatory intent is
difficult at best, the EEC has not viewed such intent as a
prerequisite to the imposition of antidumping duties. Instead, under
Regulation 2176/84,5 the EEC will impose duties when dumping
127
13. J. BESSLER & A. WIuIAMs, ANTI-DUMPING AND ANTI-SUBSIDY LAW: THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNTES 42 (1986).
14. Id. at 44.
15. EEC Reg. 2176184, 0. J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 201) (1984).
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that results in injury to existing Community interests occurs. 6
During 1990, the Court heard three major cases regarding
antidumping duties. In particular, it decided cases brought by
businesses which had taken issue with the effect of these duties and
the method of their application.
A. Extramet Industrie SA v. EC Council 7
In Extramet Industrie SA v. EC Council, an importer of calcium
metal brought an action to stay antidumping duties. Council
Resolution 2808/89 imposed antidumping duties of 21.8 % and 22 %
on imports of calcium metal originating in China and the U.S.S.R.
The two largest processors of calcium metal in the EEC were a
Community producer and an importer which relied on material
primarily from China and the U.S.S.R.
The importer brought proceedings before the EC seeking an
interim stay on application of the antidumping duties until the
Court made a final ruling in the underlying action."8 The importer
claimed that, because of the duty, it had lost nearly all its sales in
the Community, representing about one-third of its production. 9
The importer also claimed that its current profitability was only a
matter of luck prompted by a rise in demand for its metals on the
world market. Should such a demand decrease, the importer
asserted that the increased price and decreased demand in Europe
would result in failure of its business. The importer further
contended that the Community producer had aggravated its problem
by refusing to supply the importer with calcium metal and that the
Community producer's difficulties were not a function of dumping,
but rather bad management and high fixed costs.
In analyzing the petition, the ECJ acknowledged that, pending
a final judicial decision regarding application of the definitive duty,
16. LASOK & BRMGF, supra note 4, at 450.
17. [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. LR. 406 (Feb. 14, 1990).
18. Id at 408-09. Article 185 of the EEC Treaty states that although actions before the ECJ do
not automatically have suspensory effect, the ECJ may in its discretion order such suspension if the
circumstances warrant it. Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 185.
19. Id at 409, [18].
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the Court could order suspension of the antidumping duty if there
were sufficient factual and legal grounds which create an
urgency." The ECJ further stated that the urgency was determined
by the need to prevent serious, irreparable damage to the party
seeking suspension.21 The ECJ case law states that the urgency
required for suspension cannot be sufficiently justified by pleading
the effects inherent in the imposition of the antidumping duty.
22
In this case, the ECJ found that the importer was pleading urgency
based on the increase in production costs within the Community
and the resulting market share loss. The Court found these impacts
to be inherent in the antidumping duty and thereby decided that
they were an inadequate justification for suspension of the duty.23
To justify the Court's finding of urgency beyond the effects of the
duty, the importer alleged in its pleading that there was a risk that
it may not be able to survive after losing part of its market in
Europe should the world market drop. The ECJ found this risk to
be speculative and therefore inadequate to justify suspension of the
duty. The Court looked at the world market for the importer's
product, and found that the demand was rising. Furthermore,
concluded the Court, because the importer's business overall was
profitable, no urgency existed to justify suspension of the duty.
The ECJ's decision in Extramet, therefore provides the model
for assessing the urgency necessary to justify suspension of
antidumping duties. When definitive antidumping duties have been
imposed, the ECJ has authority to grant suspension for urgency
pending judicial appeal of those duties. The urgency necessary to
justify such a suspension, however, must be independent of the
results inherent in the antidumping duty itself. The ECJ will
examine the business's current profitability and its position with
respect to the entire world market, not simply its position within
the European Community. To fulfill the condition of urgency, the
20. Id. at 409, 1 [16] (citing Article 82(2) of the Rules of Procedure).
21. Id. at 409, 1 [171.
22. Extramet at 409, [20] (citing Technointorg v. EC Council, [1987] E. Comm. Ct. 3. Rep.
1793, [1987] 3 Comm. Mkt. LR. 491).
23. Id.
129
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importer must show with particularity existing conditions which
would lead to irreparable serious damage.
In analyzing the request for the suspension, the Extramet Court
did not address the petitioner's allegation that the Community
producer had caused its own injury. The Court's analysis in this
case implies that the actions of the Community producer in causing
the injury which led to the imposition of antidumping duties is not
a relevant factor in determining whether sufficient urgency exists
to justify suspension of the antidumping duty.
B. Antidumping as Applied to Original Equipment Manufacturers
In 1990, the ECJ decided two antidumping cases, Nashua Corp.
and Others v. EEC Commission and EC Council4 and Gestetner
Holdings plc v. EC Council and EEC Commission.' These cases
resulted from the imposition of antidumping duties on plain paper
copiers (PPCs) manufactured in Japan. In each of these cases, the
complaining party was an Original Equipment Manufacturer
(OEM). An OEM is a company that imports foreign-made products,
manufactured to the OEM's specifications, into the Community
under its own brand name.26 The nature of the importers in each
case raised questions regarding the calculation of the dumping duty,
how the duty should apply to the OEM, and whether the OEM had
standing to protest the imposition of the duty at all.
1. Nashua Corp. and Others v. EC Commission and EC
Council
The first of these two cases, decided the same day, was brought
by the Nashua Corporation, a company headquartered in the United
States with subsidiaries in the Community. Nashua purchases most
of its PPCs from the Japanese company, Ricoh, with the purchase
24. [1990] 1 Comm. Mkt. LR. 6 (Mar. 14, 1990).
25. [1990] 1 Comm. Mkt. LR. 820 (Mar. 14, 1990).
26. Nashua Corp. and Others v. EEC Commission and EC Council, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
6, 11 (Mar. 14, 1990).
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taking place in Japan. Ricoh makes the PPCs to Nashua's
specifications and bearing Nashua's trademark livery. Nashua is
solely responsible for exporting, shipping, marketing, selling, and
servicing the machines once they are purchased from Ricoh.
In February, 1987, the EC Council, based on a recommendation
of the EEC Commission, passed Regulation 535/87 imposing a
definitive antidumping duty on PPCs purchased in Japan.27 The
twenty percent antidumping duty applied to all PPCs exported by
Ricoh, whether sold through an OEM or not. In response, Nashua
proposed an undertaking2 8 under EC Council Regulation 2176/84,
Article 10 in an effort to limit the injury caused by the dumping.29
The undertaking proposed limiting the number of units brought into
the Community and included Nashua's pledge to "do its utmost to
prevent evasion by resales from outside the EEC and ... supply
regular reports and information to the EEC Commission to ensure
effectiveness of the undertaking.", 30 The EEC Commission
rejected the undertaking. This prompted Nashua to file suit seeking
annulment of the rejection and the antidumping duty imposed by
EC Council Regulation 535/87.
Nashua's complaint first argued that the Court should annul the
EEC Commission's rejection of their undertaking offered in accord
with Article 10, Regulation 2176/84. In dismissing this portion of
Nashua's complaint, the ECJ pointed out that EEC Commission
decisions are not final, but rather are only recommendations which
the EC Council is free to disregard if it so chooses.31 Because the
EC Commission's decisions are not final, they lack the binding
effect required for annulment actions under Article 173. Rejection
of the undertaking by the EEC Commission becomes binding only
after the EC Council confirms the rejection by imposing a
definitive antidumping duty.32 In the ECJ's view, therefore,
27. EEC Council Reg. 535/87 (1987) 0. J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 54/12) (1987).
28. An undertaking is a proposal in which the offeror commits to a specific modification of its
pricing or volume of exports in order to eliminate the Community injury and thereby avoid
imposition of an antidumping duty.
29. EEC Reg. 2176/84, supra note 15.
30. Nashua at 15.
31. Id. at 16.
32. Id. at 42, 1 [8].
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Nashua's proper procedural course was to go before the EC
Council and argue against the adoption of the definitive duty, and
if that failed, to then contest the duty itself before the Court. The
ECJ therefore found this portion of Nashua's complaint
inadmissible.
Nashua's second argument was to seek annulment of EC
Council Regulation 535/87 imposing the duty on Ricoh PPCs. The
Court considered whether Nashua had standing to bring an action
for annulment of the regulations. To have standing, the regulations
must be of direct and individual concern to the exporter in
question.33
Based on the Court's previous cases, the Council argued that a
finding of direct and individual concern required one of two
circumstances. The trader must be either: (1) A producer or
exporter whose own business activities showed a practice of
dumping or (2) an importer whose resale prices were used to
substantiate the existence of dumping.' Independent importers, on
the other hand, were not seen as being directly and individually
concerned. The EC Council contended that Nashua belonged in the
independent importer category.
The Advocate General (AG)35 began his analysis of the issue
by noting that the OEM's association, or lack thereof, with the
manufacturer was neither sufficient nor a necessary condition to a
finding of direct and individual concern.36 In rejecting the EC
Council's argument, the AG pursued three primary lines of
analysis. First, the AG focused not on whether Nashua was an
exporter or importer, but on its status as an OEM selling products
manufactured by a company found to be dumping. Given the
relationship between Nashua and Ricoh, the AG noted that if Ricoh
were directly and individually concerned, as was undisputed, then
33. Id. at 42.
34. Id. at 20.
35. The Advocate General (AG) is required to offer an impartial opinion to the ECJ prior to
the Court handing down its opinion. While the ECY is not bound by the AG's opinion, these opinions
are often persuasive. The AG's opinions tend to provide valuable insight into the Court's reasoning
process because they give a more detailed analysis of the legal issues than are normally found in the
ECJ's statement of judgment itself. BEBR, supra note 3, at 8-9.
36. Nashua at 21.
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Nashua would be in the same position with regard to the
Ricoh-produced products it sold under the Nashua brand. The fact
that the weighted dumping margin for Ricoh was calculated with
reference to the difference in Ricoh's sales to Nashua versus its
sales to other purchasers supported the AG's reasoning.37 Further,
Nashua's distinctive livery on the PPCs brought through customs
into the Community distinguished the product and its owner. As a
result of the product's distinguishing appearance, customs officials
would apply duty based on the Nashua brand. The AG concluded
that this made Nashua directly and individually concerned with the
regulation imposing the duty.38
In his second line of reasoning, the AG recognized the linkage
between the admissibility issue and the arguments on the merits of
the case. Nashua complained that it should have been treated as the
exporter of its own products and therefore a dumping margin
should have been calculated for it separate from Ricoh. While not
reaching a conclusion on the issue at this point, the AG noted that
if this argument had merit, then failure to provide the separate
calculation would single out Nashua, making it directly and
individually concerned with the regulation.39
Finally, the AG noted that undertakings offered under
Regulation 2176/84, such as the one offered by Nashua, were
efforts by individual firms to minimize the injury caused by
dumping and thus avoid imposition of the duty. Therefore, when
the Council ratifies the Commission's rejection of such an
undertaking by imposing a definitive duty, the decision is of direct
and individual concern to the firm unsuccessfully proposing the
undertaking. 40 The AG therefore considered Nashua to be directly
and individually concerned, and advised that its application for
annulment was thus admissible.41
In its judgment, the ECJ agreed with the AG, and found that
Nashua was directly and individually concerned. The Court based
37. Id. at 23.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 24.
40. Id. at 25.
41. Nashua at 25.
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its judgment on the fact that in constructing the normal value for
the dumped products, the EC Council and EEC Commission (the
Institutions) used the costs incurred by Ricoh in its sales to OEMs,
as compared to its costs for sales under its own brand.4" This
normal value was then used to calculate a weighted dumping
margin for Ricoh that reflected its sales through its distribution
channels. This weighted dumping margin was used to calculate the
duty.43 The ECJ noted that, in making these calculations, the
Institutions specifically identified the traders involved. As one of
those traders, Nashua was directly and individually concerned with
the duty imposed on Ricoh." The Court therefore held that
Nashua's complaint was admissible.
The Court then turned to the merits of the case. To support its
claim, Nashua made the following five submissions:
(1) miscalculation of the dumping margin;
(2) incorrect construction of the normal value of
products sold to OEMs;
(3) miscalculation of the antidumping
duty;
(4) infringement of the principle prohibiting
discrimination; and
(5) illegality of the refusal of its undertaking.45
The ECJ rejected each of Nashua's five submissions.
In seeking annulment, Nashua first alleged that the Institutions
incorrectly calculated the dumping margin for Ricoh as a whole,
including all OEM sales. Nashua further claimed that a separate
margin should be calculated for it apart from Ricoh. Nashua
supported this argument by characterizing itself as an exporter. This
characterization is based on the fact that Nashua purchases the
Nashua-branded PPCs in Japan and is solely responsible for its own
exporting, sales, and after-sale service. Nashua pointed out that its
suggested separate calculation was in line with previous EC
42. Id. at 43, [17].
43. Id at 43, [18].
44. Id. at 43, 1 [19], [20].
45. Id. at 44.
134
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Council decisions because the Council had on a number of prior
occasions calculated separate margins for exporters of products
purchased from a dumping manufacturer.46
In responding to Nashua's argument, the EC Council and the
ECI agreed that the appropriateness of a separate margin depended
upon the characterization of Nashua as either an importer or an
exporter. Only if the Court classified the company as an exporter
would a separate margin be possible. In considering this issue, the
ECJ had difficulty recognizing a company, such as Nashua, that is
not established in the export country as an exporter. The ECJ also
distinguished Nashua from other exporters for whom separate
margins had been calculated because unlike those exporters,
Nashua neither produced PPCs itself nor sold them on the domestic
Japanese market.47
The ECJ finally rejected Nashua's argument by considering the
method for calculating the dumping margin found in EEC
Regulation 2176/84. Article 2(13)(a) of the regulation defines the
dumping margin as the "amount by which the normal value (of the
product) exceeds the export price. ' , 48 The normal value is the
price payable for a like product in the domestic market of the
country of origin. The export price is "the price actually paid for
the product sold for export to the Community."' 49 Therefore,
because Ricoh sold the PPC's to Nashua for export to the
Community,the price paid to Ricoh established the export price. It
then followed that Ricoh's export price is used to calculate the
dumping margin, and the dumping must therefore be attributed to
Ricoh.
The ECJ also rejected, on policy grounds, the calculation of a
separate dumping margin. The ECJ recognized that calculation of
a separate margin resulting in lower duties for OEMs, such as
Nashua, would encourage Ricoh to sell more of its products
through OEMs. This would lead to an increase in Ricoh's dumping,
46. Nashua at 26.
47. Id. at 44, 1 [26].
48. Id at 27.
49. Id. at 44, 1 [24].
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thereby expanding the Community injury and defeating the purpose
of the duty.50
Finally, the Court refused Nashua's suggestion that it follow the
method of applying antidumping duties used in the United States.
In Nashua, the ECJ referred to its prior decision, Canon v. EC
Council, and stated that the Community need not follow the same
course as its trading partners, even a major one such as the United
States.5
Nashua's second submission was that the method adopted by the
Institutions for construction of the normal value of products sold
to OEMs did not consider the appreciable differences between sales
to OEMs and sales under the manufacturer's own brand. "Normal
value" is constructed by computing the exporter's production cost,
including its selling, administrative and other general expenses, and
then adding a reasonable profit margin. The normal value is
compared to the export price to determine if dumping is occurring.
The Institutions used a 5% profit margin in constructing the normal
value instead of the 14.6% used elsewhere. Nashua claimed that
this adjustment to profit margin alone failed to reflect the reduced
sales, administrative and overhead expenses involved in sales to
OEMs as opposed to sales to an ordinary dealer.52
The Court rejected this argument, finding that the Institutions
had considered the difference in expenses associated with the
different sales methods. However, since there was no way to
accurately gauge that difference, the Institutions found that
adjustment in the profit margin alone could cover the estimated
differences in cost as well. Nashua had given no information to
show that the profit margin used was inadequate to cover the
alleged differences among all OEMs.53 Since Nashua failed to
meet the burden of proof, the Court dismissed this portion of
Nashua's complaint.
136
50. Id. at 44-45, 1 [251, [29].
51. Nashua at 45, [30] (citing [19891 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 915, at 1 [15]).
52. Id. at 33.
53. Md at 46, 1 [33], [34].
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Nashua's third claim was that the EC Council erred in
calculating the antidumping duty on the basis of prices charged by
Ricoh's subsidiaries in Europe rather than prices charged by
Nashua itself. The ECJ responded by pointing out that Regulation
2176/84 requires that the duty not exceed either the dumping
margin or the extent of the injury.54 This standard gives the EC
Council wide discretion in choosing the method for calculating the
duty. This calculation may be different than the method used to
calculate the margin.55 The court also noted that the antidumping
duty represents a comprehensive approach to address the
cumulative injury caused by a representative percentage of all
exports to the Community dumped by Japanese companies (in this
case seventy percent).56 Since Nashua failed to show that this
approach had the effect of making the duty significantly different
from what it would have been had the OEM prices been used for
calculation, the Court rejected this submission.57
Nashua's fourth claim was discrimination. The company alleged
that although on its face the duty was applied uniformly to all
Ricoh products, in absolute terms, Nashua paid a higher duty than
Ricoh's related subsidiaries. This claim is based on the fact that
Nashua's profit margin was sixteen percent compared with forty-
two percent for Ricoh's subsidiaries. The ECJ rejected this
argument saying that the difference in treatment is a product of
Ricoh's pricing policies. Further, the Court noted that the purpose
of the duty is to remove the injury to the Community, not to assure
all importers the same profit margin."
Nashua's final claim was that the EEC Commission had
illegally refused to consider the undertaking offered by Nashua, and
the EC Council's imposition of the definitive antidumping duty had
confirmed that refusal.59 The ECJ rejected this claim, noting that
both Article 7 of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code and Regulation
54. Id. at 46, [36].
55. Id.
56. Nashua, at 46, 1 [37].
57. Id. at 46, 1 [38].
58. Id. at 47, " [40], [41].
59. Id. at 47, [43].
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2176/84 provided for acceptance of undertakings from exporters
only. ' The ECJ justified this conclusion by noting that acceptance
of undertakings from importers would encourage them to continue
to import products at dumped prices. The Court also noted that the
large number of importers involved would make monitoring
compliance with the undertakings an extremely difficult task."'
In summary, the ECJ rejected each of Nashua's claims. As a
result, Nashua remained subject to the duty imposed on all Ricoh
products. Calculation of that duty was based on a weighted
dumping margin which took into account all Ricoh produced
products, regardless of the channel of distribution used for the sale
of those products.
2. Gestetner Holdings plc v. EC Council and EEC Commission
The second of the antidumping cases relating to OEMs heard by
the ECJ in 1990 also arose from the imposition of antidumping
duties on PPCs imported from Japan. Gestetner, a British company,
purchased all its brand name PPCs from Mita, a Japanese
manufacturer. Mita would first ship the products to warehouses in
Japan designated by Gestetner's agent. A delivery note for each
consignment was then presented to Mita Japan, which sent the note
to Mita Europe. Mita Europe then invoiced Gestetner, and drew
payment from a letter of credit established by Gestetner. 62 As a
result of the imposition of antidumping duties on Mita, Gestetner
was also subject to such duties. Gestetner filed suit in the ECJ
seeking annulment of the regulation imposing duties on PPCs
imported from Japan. In the alternative, Gestetner sought
annulment of the regulation insofar as it imposed duties on PPCs
manufactured by Mita.
Before turning to the merits of the case, the ECJ addressed the
admissibility of Gestetner's complaint. The ECJ found Gestetner's
60. Id. at 47, [45].
61. Nashua at 48, 1 [46].
62. Gestetner Holdings plc v. EC Council and EEC Commission, [1990] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
820, 828 (Mar. 14, 1990).
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principle claim, annulment of the entire regulation imposing the
antidumping duty on PPCs from Japan, to be inadmissible. The
Court based its conclusion on the reasoning that:
a regulation imposing different anti-dumping duties on a
series of traders is of direct concern to any one of them only
in respect of those provisions which impose on that trader a
specific anti-dumping duty and determine the amount
thereof, and not in respect of those provisions which impose
anti-dumping duties on other undertakings.63
On the other hand, the Court considered Gestetner's alternate
claim, annulment of the regulation insofar as it imposes a duty on
Mita PPCs, appropriate under the above quoted criteria. Using the
same reasoning found in Nashua, the ECJ found the alternate claim
admissible."
On the merits of the case, Gestetner set forth five submissions,
as follows:
(1) Miscalculation of the export price;
(2) incorrect comparison of the normal value
and the export price;
(3) incorrect definition of Community industry;
(4) incorrect assessment of the interests of the Community;
and
(5) inadequate reasons for rejection of the
undertaking offered by Gestetner.
Under its first claim, Gestetner argued that the export price, on
which the dumping margin was calculated, was incorrectly
constructed. The Council determined the export price as the amount
which is paid when the imported product is first sold to an
independent buyer.65 This standard led the Council to use the
price invoiced by Mita Europe to Gestetner, with a deduction of
63. Id. at 842, [12].
64. Id. at 844.
65. Id. at 828.
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five percent for the role played by Mita Europe." Gestetner
argued that since it was completely independent of Mita, the price
paid to Mita was the export price, and therefore no adjustments
should be made for the role played by Mita Europe.67 This
adjustment is important because the comparison of normal value
with the export price determines the dumping margin. If the higher,
unadjusted export price advocated by Gestetner had been used, the
dumping margin would have been less.
In analyzing the problem, the AG noted that Mita Europe did
not actually purchase the products and then resell them to
Gestetner. Instead, the AG concluded that Mita Europe acted as the
agent of Mita Japan. In view of Mita Europe's role as an agent, its
costs were considered part of Mita Japan's direct selling expenses.
Article 2(10)(c) of EEC Regulation 2176/84 requires that the
Institutions consider such selling expenses when making allowances
for the difference in selling costs between domestic and export
sales.6
The ECJ found that the price should be constructed in
accordance with Article 2(8)(b) of Regulation 2176/84. This Article
requires that the export price take as its basis the price at which the
imported product is first resold to an independent buyer.' In this
case, the export price would be the price invoiced by Mita Europe
to Gestetner, with a deduction to account for the role played by
Mita Europe in those sales.7" Since Gestetner had not challenged
the five percent amount used by the Council for that adjustment,
the ECJ found the export price determined to be correct and
dismissed this portion of Gestetner's complaint.
Gestetner next claimed that the calculation by the Institutions of
the dumping margin was incorrect because the comparison of
normal value of the product and its export price was not performed
at the "same level of trade." Gestetner alleged that adequate
allowances were not made to the normal value of the product to
66. Id.
67. Gestetner at 827-28.
68. Id. at 830.
69. Id. at 845, [29].
70. Id. at 845, [34].
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reflect the different cost and profit margins associated with sales to
OEMs versus sales of the manufacturer's own brand name
products. It clained that this violated Regulation 2176/84, Articles
(9) and (10).71
The Court rejected Gestetner's argument because the Institutions
adjusted the normal value by considering the difference in costs
and profits between OEM sales and sales through other distribution
channels. The ECJ explained that the Institutions made an
adjustment to profit margin72 to assure price comparisons at the
same level of trade. The Court considered adjustment in this single
factor as adequate in the absence of a more precise way to
calculate the difference in both costs and profit margins between
OEM and other sales. Like Nashua, Gestetner failed to show any
further need for adjustment, and the Court dismissed its
complaint.73
Gestetner's third claim alleged that the Institutions incorrectly
defined the term "Community Industry." In order to determine the
existence of an injury within the Community sufficient to justify
imposition of duties, the "Community Industry" must necessarily
be defined.74 The error alleged by Gestetner was that the
Institutions had improperly included four Community producers7"
whose links with Japanese exporters had, in fact, contributed to the
Community injury resulting. from the dumping of Japanese PPCs.
The ECJ responded that Article 4(5)76 affords the Council broad
71. EEC Reg. 2176/84, supra note 15, at arts. 9, 10.
72. The profit margin used for OEM sales was 5% while for other sales it was 14.6%. This
difference was designed to reflect the reduced selling costs born by the manufacturer in the case of
OEM sales. See generally supra notes 24-61 and accompanying text (discussing Nashua).
73. Gestemer at 846, 1 [39].
74. EEC Reg. 2176184, supra note 15, at art. 4.
75. The companies named were Rank Xerox, Tetras, Olivetti, and Oce.
76. In Article 4(5), "Community Industry" refers to:
the Community producers as a whole of the like product or to those of them
whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total
Community production of those products except that:
-when producers are related to the exporters or importers or are
themselves importers of the allegedly dumped... product the term
"'Community Industry" may be interpreted as referring to the rest of
the producers;
Gestetner at 847, [42].
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discretion to apply "Community Industry" to individual
companies, and that such application must be done on a case-by-
case basis." The ECJ also held that the EC Council's
determination would be overturned only if manifest error had been
shown. Gestetner had not shown such error, and the ECJ therefore
dismissed this issue.78
Gestetner's fourth submission criticized the E. C. Council for
imposing antidumping duties in this case. Gestetner argued that
such duties should be imposed only "where the facts as finally
established show that... the interests of the Community call for
Community intervention. ' 79 Here, Gestetner claimed that the EC
Council failed to consider the impact of the duty on competition,
prices, and ultimately, the consumer. In rejecting this claim, the
AG noted that the decision to impose duties requires a balance of
complex, and often competing, economic factors considered in both
the long and short run.P Because of the complexity of this
assessment, the AG noted that the ECJ has consistently held that
reversal would occur only when the EC Council had manifestly
erred in appraisal of facts or rules of procedure or had clearly
abused its power."' The AG determined that the EC Council
committed no such error.82
In this case, the ECJ found that the EC Council had properly
considered the interests of all parties concerned, and had adequately
taken account of the competitive markets and potential price
increases that would flow from imposition of the duty. The ECJ
therefore affirmed the EC Council's conclusion that the benefits of
the antidumping duty outweighed the burden of higher prices to
consumers, and further indicated that the preservation of
competition and opportunity for Community producers outweighed
the concerns of consumers.8 3 The ECJ also noted that the
77. Gestetner at 847, [43].
78. Id. at 850, [61].
79. Id. at 837 (citing EEC Reg. 2176/84 at art. 12(1)).
80. lit at 837.
81. Id. (citing Case 255/84, Nachi Fujikoshi v. EC Council, at 1 [21]).
82. Gestetner at 838.
83. Id. at 850, [64].
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imposition of antidumping duties in this case was necessary to
preserve the existence of an independent Community photocopier
industry which would retain jobs and encourage technological
development in this industry.84
Finally, Gestetner appealed the EC Council's rejection of the
undertaking it had submitted, wherein it offered to raise its prices.
Referring to the Nashua case, the AG reiterated his stand that
undertakings could not be accepted from importers such as
Gestetner. They were not a well-defined group, and once an,
undertaking had been accepted from one, it would be necessary to
do so for all. This procedure would present an unworkable
administrative burden.85 The ECJ agreed with the AG, resting its
conclusion on both Article 7 of the GATT Anti-Dumping Code,
86
which provides for acceptance of undertakings from exporters only,
and on Article 10 of Regulation 2176/84, which allows for
undertakings to be accepted from importers only in exceptionalcircumstances.8 7
The AG also pointed out that, as a matter of policy, the
undertaking proposed by Gestetner should not be allowed. Instead
of eliminating the injury to the Community, this proposal would
only allow Gestetner a larger profit without offering any incentive
to buy from Community producers.88 Such an undertaking would
only help Community distributors, not the intended beneficiaries,
the Community producers.89
In summary, the ECJ rejected each of Gestetner's claims, using
much the same reasoning that it applied in Nashua. Gestetner
remained subject to antidumping duties imposed on all Mita
products, and because it could not clearly be classified as an
exporter, it was denied the opportunity to submit an undertaking in
an effort to mitigate those duties.
84. Id. at 850, 1 [64].
85. Id. at 840.
86. [1980] 1 Com. L. Eur. 7.
87. Gestetner at 851, [70].
88. Id. at 839.
89. Id. at 840.
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The ECJ's decisions in Nashua and Gestetner provide valuable
information to OEMs about the effect of any antidumping duties
imposed on their suppliers. These decisions make it clear that an
OEM that is not established in the country of export has little
chance of successfully attaining a calculation of the dumping
margin separate from its supplier. While the Court may consider
the prices charged by the OEM in calculating a weighted dumping
margin for the manufacturer/supplier, the OEM is likely to be
subjected to the whole of that weighted calculation and not simply
to the portion attributable to the OEM alone.
The export price used to calculate the dumping margin is the
price of the product sold for export to the OEM or the first
independent buyer, not its resale price to the Community buyer. In
the absence of clear information about such export prices, the
Institutions will construct the price by considering the cost to the
producer, including the costs of selling, plus a reasonable profit
margin. Although the costs associated with sales to OEMs may
significantly differ from the costs of sales to domestic buyers,
adjustments for such differences are likely to be included in a
single adjustment of profit margin. To change this method of
calculation, the OEM has the burden of proof to show with
particularity, the cost differences associated with the specific
circumstances of its purchases from the manufacturer.
The Institutions will not consider undertakings offered by an
OEM to avoid the antidumping duty imposed because of its
manufacturer's dumping practices. The ECJ in Nashua and
Gestetner confirmed the traditional practice of rejecting
undertakings from importers. The nature of OEMs as neither purely
importer or exporter was irrelevant to the ECJ. OEMs represent a
large group of companies, not easily identifiable in the application
of duties, and acceptance of an undertaking from one of them
would impose unworkable administrative and monitoring tasks on
the Institutions.
Finally, the ECJ's focus in determining the proper application
of antidumping duties clearly revolves around the protection of
Community industries and the preservation of competition in a
climate which will allow these industries to flourish. While this
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determination requires an examination of complex economic issues,
the public interest of keeping prices low for the consumer is of
only secondary interest to the ECJ in this evaluation.
Il. ABUSE OF DOMINANT PosmoN
An important case decided by the ECJ in 1990 involving abuse
of a dominant position was Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission
of the European Communities.' This was a case of first
impression in which the ECJ interpreted Articles 85 and 86 of the
EEC Treaty to determine whether they conflicted, and if so, which
provision would predominate.
Tetra Pak, a Swiss company, controlled approximately ninety
percent of the Community market in aseptic packaging and fifty
percent of the Community market in fresh milk packaging. This
dominant position was further enhanced when Tetra Pak purchased
the Liquipak Group, holder of an exclusive patent for a sterilization
technique for the packaging of liquid foods.9 After the
acquisition, Elopak, a Norwegian company, brought a complaint
alleging that Tetra Pak violated Article 8592 and Article 86.
90. Case T-51/89 (not yet reported, copy on file at the office of THE TRANSNATIONAL
LAWYER).
91. Id. at Advocate General's Opinion.
92. Article 85 states:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which
have as their object of effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of
competition within the common market, and in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of:
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By virtue of its exclusive license, Liquipak held a block
exemption under Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty. This exemption
allowed the company to engage in certain practices which would
otherwise be seen as restricting or distorting competition, and
therefore in violation of the Treaty provisions. The purpose of such
an exemption is to encourage the transfer and development of
"know how." Therefore, when Tetra Pak acquired Liquipak, Tetra
Pak also acquired the benefit of the exemption. According to the
petitioner, this acquisition should not allow Tetra Pak to elude the
provisions of Article 86 which were designed to prevent the
distortion of competition by a company in a dominant position.94
Tetra Pak, by virtue of its ninety percent market share in aseptic
packaging and fifty percent market share in milk packaging clearly
dominated the market in aseptic packaging. The key question,
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods
or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable
to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect
of a substantial part of the products in question.
Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 85.
93. Article 86 states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 86.
94. "Dominant position" is defined as a monopoly within a sector of the economy. LAsOK &
BRWOE, supra note 4, at 437-38.
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therefore, was whether Article 86 could be applied to a company
holding an Article 85 exemption.95
Beginning its analysis, the Court noted that both Articles have
as their primary objective the preservation of undistorted
competition. The ECJ noted, however, that the two Articles have
different applications. Article 85 applies to agreements between
companies, decisions of associations, or concerted practices. Article
86 affects the unilateral acts of one or more companies. As a result,
although their goals are the same, the Court approaches these two
Articles from different levels.96
The ECJ found that the presence of an exemption under Article
85 does not stop the inquiry as to violation of Article 86. That
inquiry focuses on the circumstances of the acquisition and the
effect it has on competition in the market. The ECJ held that an
abuse of Article 86 would exist whenever the undertaking held by
the dominant company had such influence on the market that its
presence weakened competition. In the Court's view, Article 86
would prohibit such an undertaking from hindering the maintenance
of existing competition or the growth of such competition by using
methods outside the normal competitive practices of commercial
operators.97 In defining the relevant inquiry in this way, the ECJ
noted that the fact that a dominant company had acquired the
exemption was not in and of itself controlling. Rather, the effect of
that acquisition on the market was key in determining whether a
violation of Article 86 existed. Applying this standard to the case,
the Court found that because Tetra Pak's acquisition precluded any
competition in the relevant market, Article 86 had indeed been
violated. 9
Tetra Pak argued that the ECJ's interpretation of these Articles
rendered application of Article 86 unpredictable, and thereby
95. Tetra Pak at "Conclusions of the parties."
96. Id. (citing Case 6/72, Europemballage and Continental Can v. EEC Commission [1973] E.
Comm. Ct. L. Rep. 215, [25]).
97. Id. at "Schematic analysis of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty and of secondary
legislation."
98. Protection of Competition by Preiention of Abuse of Dominant Position, London Times,
Sept. 13, 1990, at Features §.
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violated the policy of uniform application of the law.99 In
rejecting this argument, the ECJ noted that national courts, in
applying Community law, can insure uniform application by
referring questions of interpretation of these Articles to the ECJ for
preliminary rulings. Further, the Court noted that a company in a
dominant position has "a special responsibility not to allow its
conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common
market," 1  and therefore cannot rely on "alleged
unpredictability of the application of Article 86 in order to escape
the prohibition there laid down." 
101
The Court's analysis in Tetra Pak reinforces the concept that
both Article 85 and Article 86 of the EEC Treaty seek to protect
competition within the Community. Article 85, however, also
attempts to temper that protection in ways which promote
innovation and transfer of "know-how."
In applying these two provisions under circumstances which
would seemingly make them contradictory, the Court is careful to
distinguish the different levels they affect. The distinction drawn by
the ECJ is that Article 85 deals with agreements between two or
more parties, while Article 86 addresses unilateral acts of a single
party. The process of acquisition, therefore, is particularly
vulnerable to the prohibitions of Article 86. Acquisitions must
therefore be analyzed in terms of their possibility for taking a
company in a dominant position into the range of the Article's
prohibitions. In particular, the acquiring company must focus on
the circumstances of the acquisition and its potential for distorting
competition within the Community. Should such distortion be
found, the prohibitions of Article 86 become controlling, and no
reliance on the exemptions offered by Article 85 will allow
dominant companies to escape their effect.
99. Tetra Pak at "Conclusions of the Parties."
100. Id (citing Case 322/81, Michelin v. EEC Commission (1983J E. Comm. Ct. L Rep. 3461).
101. Id
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IV. SOCIAL PoLicY BEFORE THE ECJ iN 1990
In addition to purely economic provisions, the EEC Treaty
addresses certain social problems based "upon the need to promote
improved working conditions and an improved standard of living
for workers."'" While recognizing that social services and
employee benefits are primarily issues of domestic concern, the
Treaty nonetheless attempts to encourage harmonization of this
social policy among the Member States. A factor in improving the
standard of living for workers and harmonization of social policy
is the facilitation of free movement of labor throughout the
Community by assuring workers an "adequate level of protection
whether at home or in another Member State. 10 3
One of the more prominent EEC social policies affecting
workers is a requirement that both men and women enjoy equal
employment opportunities. This equal opportunity requirement,
which is embodied in Article 119 of the EEC Treaty, and clarified
in a number of Council Directives, I1 4 gave rise to two cases
before the ECJ in 1990, Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange
Assurance Group"0 5 and Foster and Others v. British Gas
plc. 106
A. Barber v. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group
In the Barber case, the ECJ considered a claim of sex
discrimination based on the pension plan of the Guardian Royal
Exchange Assurance Group of Great Britain. The petitioner, Mr.
Barber, had been employed by Car & G Co. since 1948. This
company was later taken over by Guardian Royal Exchange
Assurance Group. Mr. Barber worked in its claims office in
102. Treaty, at art. 117.
103. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 465.
104. See Council Directive 75/117, [1975] OJ. Eur. Com. (No. L 45/19), (1979) 1 Com. L. Eur.
29; Council Directive 76/207, [1976] OJ. Eur. Com. (No. L 39/40), (1979) 1 Com. L. Eur. 34;
Council Directive 79/7, [1979] OJ. Eur. Com. (No. L 6/24), (1979) 1 Com. L. Eur. 42; Council
Directive 86/378, [1986] OJ. Eur. Com. (No. L 255/40), (1987) 1 Com. L. Eur. 170.
105. [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 513.
106. [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 833.
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Sheffield from 1970 until 1980 when the office was closed and Mr.
Barber was dismissed for redundancy (lay-off). 0 7
The Guardian pension plan was funded solely by employer
contributions and was a "contracted out scheme."1 8 Under the
plan, the pensionable age for men and women varied, with the age
set at sixty-two for men and fifty-seven for women. In the event of
redundancy, employees received immediate pension benefits if they
had attained the age of fifty-five for men or fifty for women.1
Mr. Barber was dismissed as redundant at age fifty-two. As the
severance terms of his employment contract required, Mr. Barber
received a cash payment, statutory redundancy pay, and an ex
gratia payment. He also received a deferred pension, to begin when
he reached the age of sixty-two."' If Barber had been a woman
of fifty-two, he would have been entitled to full pension benefits.
Considering this payment system to be discriminatory, Mr. Barber
brought an action before the Industrial Tribunal in Britain claiming
unlawful discrimination based on sex. After Mr. Barber's claim
was dismissed by that tribunal, he followed the appeal process,
leading eventually to the Court of Appeal.' That Court sought
a preliminary ruling from the ECJ to determine if redundancy
benefits, including a private pension, were subject to the
Community laws requiring equal pay for men and women.
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty requires each Member State to
"ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle
that men and women should receive equal pay for equal
work."' 2 The ECJ began its analysis by determining whether the
107. Barberv. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 513,518.
108. A "'contracted out scheme" is one which substitutes for the earnings related portion of a
state pension scheme, allowing those covered by it to reduce their contributions to the national
scheme, "corresponding to the basic flat-rate pension payable under the national scheme to all
workers regardless of their earnings." Id. at 524, $17.
109. Id at 518-19.
110. Id. at 519.
111. Id. at 519-20.
112. Article 119 states:
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently
maintain the application of the principle that men and women should receive
equal pay for equal work.
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1991 / European Court of Justice: 1990 Cases
term "pay" in Article 119 included redundancy and pension
benefits. Addressing first the redundancy pay, the ECJ found that
whether required by statute or employment agreement, redundancy
payments did fall within Article 119. In reaching this conclusion,
the AG explained that "the crux of the matter is the existence of
an unseverable causal connection between the employment and the
benefit." 113 Such a connection is found when an "employer
makes a payment out of his own funds to workers which he
himself employs . . .on account of their work .. . ., In this
case, the employer made the redundancy payment on the basis of
the severance scheme laid out in the employee's handbook, with
amounts paid determined by the duration of the employee's tenure
with the company. 5 The ECJ found that the payments thereby
satisfied the "causal connection between the employment and the
benefit" and were "pay" within the meaning of Article 119.116
In considering whether the pension benefits were "pay" under
Article 119, the ECJ differentiated between statutory pension plans
and private pension plans. Referring to its decision in Defrenne
I,117 the Court noted that statutory pensions are not within Article
119 because they are determined by social policy, not by the
employment relationship between employer and employee. On the
other hand, private pensions, such as Guardian's, were an integral
part of the employment agreement entered into by employer and
employee. Even though Guardian's plan was a "contracted out
scheme," which by definition substituted for a portion of the state
For the purpose of this Article, "pay" means the ordinary basic or minimum
wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the
worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment from his
employer.
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means:
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the basis
of the same unit of measurement;
(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job.
Treaty, supra note 1, at art. 119.
113. Barber at 523.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 519.
116. Id. at 553, " [13], [14].
117. Id. at 525 (citing Case 80170, Defrenne v. Belgium: (1971] E. Comm. Ct. L. Rep. 445,
[1974] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 494, 11 7, 9).
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social security scheme, the ECJ viewed it as different than a
statutory scheme. The Court found determinative that the plan was
fully funded by employer contributions and was established not by
statute, but by the company's severance terms which were
contractual in nature." 8 The ECJ concluded, therefore, that the
Guardian pension plan benefits were connected to the employment
relationship and thus were "pay" under Article 119.
The ECJ then considered if the scheme used by the Guardian
plan violated Article 119 in view of the fact that its differing
treatment of men and women followed the national statutory
pension scheme. In deciding the issue, the ECJ noted that Article
119 prohibited pay discrimination as between men and women
regardless of the. system which established the inequality." 9 On
that basis, the fact that Guardian's scheme followed the national
statutory scheme had no effect in the application of Article
119.120
In concluding that Article 119 prohibited pension plans, such as
Guardian's, the ECJ noted that Article 119 required equality at
each level of remuneration. It was insufficient to satisfy Article
119, said the Court, to base the "equal pay" analysis on a
comprehensive assessment of all consideration paid. Such an
analysis would not provide sufficient clarity to allow national
courts to effectively review and assure compliance with Article
119.121
The ECJ concluded by stating that Article 119 prohibits the use
of differing age conditions according to gender with regard to
receipt of pension and severance benefits. The ECJ continued by
saying that only those proceedings already pending before the
National or Community Courts or filed after the date of this
judgment could rely on the decision." The ECJ declined to
make the judgment retroactive in recognition of the serious
118. Barber at 555, [25].
119. Id. at 556, [32].
120. Id.
121. Id. at 557, 1 [34].
122. Id. at 559, 1 [45].
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financial consequences to pension and benefit programs that would
result. 12
3
B. Foster and Others v. British Gas pic.
12 4
The British House of Lords brought the case of Foster and
Others v. British Gas plc. to the ECJ seeking a preliminary ruling
on the application of Council Directive 76/207'25 which mandates
equal treatment in employment for men and women. The
petitioners in the underlying action were female employees of the
British Gas Corporation (BGC) who were required to retire on
reaching the age of sixty. These retirements occurred between
December 27, 1985, and July 22, 1986. During that period of time,
the BGC's mandatory retirement age for men was sixty-five and
sixty for women.1
2 6
At the time of the petitioners' retirements, the BGC was a
nationalized gas corporation with a monopoly on the gas supply to
homes and businesses in Great Britain. 27 The BGC was therefore
subject to the supervision of the Secretary of State and was
required to report on its activities to the Secretary, who then passed
those reports to the Houses of Parliament. The Secretary could give
general directions to the BGC for the performance of its functions
in the national interest, and the BGC was obligated to comply with
those directions. The Secretary of State had the authority to require
that the BGC pay over funds to him or allocate funds for
specialized purposes, and again, BGC was obligated to comply.
The BGC was not, however, considered an agent of the Secretary
of State, nor were its employees in the Crown's employment for
purposes of British law. 12
In analyzing the question presented by the House of Lords, the
ECJ first determined whether the Directive 76/207 applied as
123. Barber at 559, 1 [44].
124. [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 833.
125. [1976] OJ. Eur. Com. (No. L 39/40), (1979) 1 Com. L. Eur. 42.
126. Foster at 836.
127. Id. at 837.
128.' Id. at 838.
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against the BGC. The ECJ began by noting that a Council
Directive may be enforced by individuals as against Member
States, but may not be used to impose obligations on an individual
in the absence of national legislation implementing the
Directive." 9 Since no such legislation exists in Britain, the first
issue the Court had to decide was whether the BGC should be
classified as part of "the State" or as an "individual."
The ECJ noted that before analyzing the issue in the case, it had
to determine jurisdiction. The Court found that because the issue
involved interpretation of a provision of Community law, the ECJ's
jurisdiction was proper. Once the ECJ gave its interpretation of the
relevant Community law, the national courts were then responsible
for determining whether a given party before them fell within
categories defined by the ECJ.130
The ECJ determined that the term "State" should be broadly
construed for purposes of applying the Directive, citing its decision
in Marshall v. Southhampton and South West-Hampshire Area
Health Authority.13 1 In Marshall the ECJ decided that "State"
must be taken broadly, as including all the organs of the State. In
matters of employment ... this means all the employees of such
organs and not just the central civil service.' 3' The ECJ found
that such a broad interpretation of the term was appropriate to
ensure that no Member State, or any public body charged with
functions by that State, would be able to derive advantage from the
Member State's failure to comply with Community law.
Returning to the facts of this case, the ECJ decided that since
the British government had failed to pass national legislation to
129. Id. at 846, 1 [16].
130. Id. at 856, 1 [15].
131. Foster at 840 (citing Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and South West-Hampshire
Area Health Auth., [1986] E. Comm. Ct. L. Rep. 723, [1986] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 688). In Marshall,
an individual was allowed to apply the provisions of a Directive against a local health authority.
Although the local authority was in no way responsible for the failure of the relevant Member State
to implement the Directive through national law, the ECJ nevertheless found that the local authority
acted as an agent of the Ministry of Health. Because this Ministry clearly fell within the definition
of the -State," it could not escape the provisions of the Directive by acting through its agent, the
local authority. The ECJ noted the necessity of this broad interpretation in order to prevent the State
from taking advantage of its own failure to implement the Directive as required.
132. Id.
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implement Directive 76/207 within the required time frame,1 33 it
was necessary to apply the Directive broadly to any State body.
Such an application prevents the Member State from deriving an
advantage from its own failure to comply with the Directive. Based
on the need for broad interpretation, the ECJ concluded that any
"body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible,
pursuant to a measure adopted by the State, for providing a public
service under the control [of] the State and has for that purpose
special powers beyond those which result from the normal rules
applicable in relations between individuals"' 34 is included in the
term "State" for purposes of applying a Council Directive. Having
thus defined the term "State" for purposes of applying the
Directive, the ECJ left the national courts to determine if BGC fell
within that definition.
The parties in the underlying case had agreed that if BGC fell
within the definition of "State" for purposes of applying Directive
76/207, then under Article 5(1) of that Directive, 135 its pension
policy was unlawful.'36 Believing that BGC did, indeed, fall
within the definition of "State," the AG turned briefly to the
question of damages. The AG noted that because Community law
did not directly address the question of damages,137 they must be
determined in accordance with the national law of the Member
State. The AG did, however, find that the ECJ's decision in Van
Colson provided the national courts with guidance on the damages
issue to the effect that "compensation must in any event be
133. Art. 9, Council Directive 76/207, [1979] OJ. Eur. Com. (No. L 34/40). Article 9 passed on
February 9, 1976 requires that "Member States shall put into force the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions necessary in order to comply with this Directive within 30 months of its
notification... Id
134. Foster at 857, 1 [20].
135. Article 5(1), Council Directive 76/207 states:
Application of the principle of equal treatment with regard to working conditions,
including the conditions governing dismissal, means that men and women shall
be guaranteed the same conditions without discrimination on grounds of sex.
136. Foster at 837, 2.
137. Id at 852-53, 1 23.
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adequate in relation to the damage sustained and must therefore
amount to more than purely nominal compensation.' ' 31
In summary, the EC broadly construed the term "State" for
purposes of defining those entities against whom Community
Directives apply. However, the court left to national courts to
decide whether a particular organization fit within theparameters
set out in the ECI's definition.
The EC's decisions in the Barber and Foster cases demonstrate
its policy of broad interpretation of Community law governing
equal employment opportunity. This policy is seen in the EC's
interpretation of the term "pay" in Article 119 as including all
forms of compensation that arise from the employment relationship,
and its interpretation of the term "State" for purposes of applying
Council Directives, as including any body under the control of the
State with special powers beyond those possessed by individuals.
This policy of broad interpretation, therefore, should provide
national courts with guidance in their efforts to apply Community
law, and thereby hasten the process of standardization of law
throughout the EEC in the area of social policy.
V. HARMONIZATION OF LAWS
In joining the European Economic Community, Member States
delegate a portion of their lawmaking power to the Community,
and agree to abide by the Community laws. 39 In implementing
Community law, however, conflicts with national laws do arise. To
meet the objectives of the EEC, therefore, the EC must make
decisions which bring the laws of the Member States into harmony
with each other and with the Community as a whole. This is a
continuing process and is an important category of the EC's
decisions in 1990.
156
138. Id. at 853 (citing Case (14/83), Van Colson and Kamman v. Land Nordrhein-Estfalen,
[1984] E. Comm. Ct. L Rep. 1891, [1986] 2 Comm. Mkt. LR. 430,1 28).
139. LASOK & BRIDGE, supra note 4, at 290.
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A. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame
Ltd. and Others"'
Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame
Ltd and Others illustrates the problem of harmonizing national and
Community laws. This case arose as a result of changes made in
1988 to the statutory system for registering fishing vessels in
Britain. This system was amended to prevent "quota hopping,"
whereby vessels flying the British flag but having no actual
connection with the United Kingdom plundered British fishing
quotas. 4 ' A group of Spanish companies which had been
operating ninety-five fishing vessels registered in the United
Kingdom sought judicial review of this amendment and challenged
whether it was compatible with Community law. 142 The Spanish
companies also sought interim relief until such time as a final
judgment was given on their underlying application for judicial
review. 14
3
In considering the application for interim relief, the British
House of Lords noted that national law prohibited the granting of
an injunction against the Crown.'" However, the House of Lords
did note that the petitioners in the underlying action would suffer
irreparable damage if the interim relief were not granted and they
were eventually successful in the underlying case. 145 This fact
was especially significant because British law does not provide for
the recovery of losses incurred during proceedings to establish a
legal right. 146 The House of Lords, therefore, sought a
preliminary ruling on whether Community law required the
granting of the interim relief requested even though national law
prohibited such relief. 47
140. [1990] 3 Comm. Mkt. LR. 867.
141. Id. at 891, 1 [4].
142. Id. at 891, 1 [3].
143. Id. at 893, 1 [10].
144. 1& at 893, 1 [13].
145. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport at 893, 1 [13].
146. Id. at 875, [8].
147. Id. at 894, 1 [15].
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The AG noted that the need for interim relief results from the
fact that there are often two different points in time that mark the
course of a law: The point where the law comes into existence and
the point when the legal right it confers is definitively established
through the judicial process. The AG clarified, however, that once
the legal right is definitively established, it applies retroactively to
the time the law was passed.14 The purpose of interim
protection, therefore, is to avoid irreparable damage by assuring
that the time needed to judicially define the right will not have the
effect of depriving the right of substance by eliminating the
possibility of exercising it.149 Interim protections, therefore, were
viewed as appropriate whenever the duration of judicial
proceedings might nullify the effectiveness of the right granted
under those proceedings.
The AG stated that acts of Parliament or the Community are
presumed to be valid until such time as a final judicial review
declares them otherwise. When such acts conflict, however, the
courts must consider whether the nature of the right claimed and
commonly assumed to exist is such that interim protection must be
granted. In making such a determination, the courts should consider
whether the claim appears to make out a valid prima facie case and
whether one or the other of the interests in question may be
prejudiced pending the final outcome of the underlying case. 0
After laying out these criteria for granting of interim relief, the
AG turned to the facts of the case. He noted that the petitioners in
the underlying case based their claim on certain Treaty provisions,
which if found applicable, would override the conflicting national
law under the concept of the supremacy of Community law over
that of the Member States. This supremacy of Community law also
"precludes the valid adoption of new national legislative measures
to the extent to which they would be incompatible with Community
provisions." ' By failing to allow interim suspension of a
148. Id. at 879, 11 [16], [17].
149. Id. at 880, 1 [18].
150. Regina v. Secretary of State for Transport at 883, 1 [22].
151. Id. at 876 (citing Simmenthal spa v. Ministero delle Finanze 1, Case 35/76, [1976] E.
Comm. Ct. L. Rep. 1871, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt. LR. I at [17]).
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national law which may be in conflict with Community law, the
AG claimed that the courts of the United Kingdom violated the
accepted concept of the supremacy of Community law.
The AG also noted that the domestic prohibition on injunctions
against the Crown could not control because the national court is
bound "to apply Community law either through the means
provided for under the national legal system or, failing that, 'of its
own motion.' ' ' 152 Since the national courts have power to
permanently override domestic laws that violate Community law,
the AG reasoned that they must also have power to provide for
interim suspension of such domestic laws pending the final judicial
decision on their compatibility with Community law.153
The ECJ therefore found that British courts could not rely on
domestic law as their only obstacle to the granting of interim relief
to safeguard the rights potentially granted under Community law.
If the rights claimed meet the criteria discussed above, the national
courts must grant an interim suspension on enforcement of the new
national law pending final judicial determination of the underlying
ease. In stating the rule of the case, the ECJ held that "Community
law must'be interpreted as meaning that a national court which, in
a case before it concerning Community law, considers that the sole
obstacle which precludes it from granting interim relief is a rule of
national law must set aside that rule." 4 This rule preserves the
supremacy of Community law over national law and, in a case such
as this, assures that national procedures do not deny the exercise of
rights granted under Community law.
B. Re a State Shareholding in Synthetic Fibres: EEC Commission
v. Belgium 155
Synthetic Fibres arose as the result of a proposal by the
Kingdom of Belgium to provide a subsidy in the form of an equity
152. Id. at 877, 1 14 (citing Simmenthal, 1 [24]).
153. Id. at 885, [24].
154. Id. at 896.
155. [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 393.
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shareholding to a company manufacturing synthetic fibres. The
Court found that this subsidy violated the EEC Treaty and an
injunction was issued after the first of two subsidy payments had
been made. 'While agreeing to abide by the injunction, Belgium
nonetheless issued the second subsidy payment, and, after being
ordered to rescind the action, failed to do so. 56
The EEC Commission petitioned the ECJ for a finding that
Belgium had failed to fulfill its obligation under the EEC Treaty
because it did not comply with Commission Decision 84/111.17
That Decision required that Belgium's proposed aid to a company
manufacturing synthetic fibres be abolished 5 ' and that Belgium
notify the Commission within two months of notification of the
Decision (December 29, 1983) of the measures it had taken to
comply with the Decision. 59 Noting that the obligation to cancel
the subsidy was the only method for rectifying the unlawful
situation prohibited by the Commission's decision, the AG stated
that the Commission's application could be denied only if Belgium
showed that it was absolutely impossible to comply with the
Decision within the period allowed."6
Belgium claimed that failure to comply in a timely manner
resulted from the regionalization of the country and the resulting
organizational changes which delayed compliance with the
order. 61 In response, the ECJ relied on its settled case law and
stated that "a member-state cannot plead measures, practices or
circumstances of its internal legal system to justify failure to fulfil
obligations and comply with time limits laid down in Community
legislation."162 The Court therefore found that Belgium breached
its Community obligations.'63
156. Id. at 396.
157. Comm'n Decision 84/111, [1984] OJ. Eur. Corn. (No. L 62/18).
158. Id at art. 1.
159. Id at art. 2.
160. Re a State Shareholding in Synthetic Fibres: EEC Commission v. Belgium, [1990] 2 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 393 at 395.
161. Id. at 398, 1 [7].
162. Id. at 398, [8].
163. Id. at 398, 1 [9].
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C. Ministere Public v. Guy Blanguernon' "
Ministere Public v. Guy Blanguernon demonstrates the ECI's
position on harmonization of laws among the Member States. The
defendant in the case was the finance director of a French company
who had failed to file his company's annual accounts in
compliance with Council Directive 78/660." The defendant
asserted that he failed to comply with the Directive because other
Member States had not yet passed the required national legislation
to implement the Directive in their own nations. The defendant
claimed, therefore, that his compliance was not yet required
because it would disadvantage his company by publicizing its
account information while its competitors in other Member States
were not yet required to do so."
The ECJ rejected the defendant's arguments, stating that "under
the legal system laid down by the Treaty the implementation of
Community law by member-States cannot be subject to a condition
of reciprocity."' 67 The ECI therefore concluded that the
defendant was obliged to follow the legislation adopted by France
intending to implement the Directive."
These cases demonstrate the ECJ's strict views on the
harmonization of the domestic laws of the Member States with
those of the Community. When doubt about the application of an
allegedly conflicting domestic law exists, as in Regina v. Secretary
of State for Transport, the ECJ is likely to require interim measures
that will protect the application of Community law until the
conflicts can be judicially resolved. In situations in which
Community law is in effect, the Court's decisions will strictly
enforce those laws unless the Member State can show that
compliance within the time frame involved is impossible.1t
164. Ministere Public v. Guy Blangucmon, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. LR. 340.
165. [1978] OJ. Eur. Com. (No. L 222/11), [1978] 1 Com. L Eur. 223.
166. Guy Blanguernon at 344, 1 [4].
167. Id. at 345, 1 [7].
168. Id. at 347.
169. Re a State Shareholding in Synthetic Fibres: EEC Commission v. Belgium, [1990] 2 Comm.
Mkt. LR. 393.
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Once the Member States pass domestic laws to implement
Community Directives, those laws will be enforced even though
such enforcement results in different treatment of businesses in
differing Member States. 7 ' While this policy attempts to bring
Community Directives into effect as soon as possible, it may
actually delay passage of appropriate domestic laws. Community
Directives generally include a designated period of time in which
Member States must adopt domestic legislation to implement the
Directive. By waiting until the end of that time period to pass the
implementing legislation, a Member State may escape the
provisions of the Directive in full effect in those other States that
have conscientiously adopted the required legislation in a more
timely manner. The ECJ's decisions, however, recognize this
problem and address it by declaring void any domestic law which
is in contradiction to the laws of the Community.
VI. CONCLUSION
This review of 1990 decisions handed down by the European
Court of Justice demonstrates the broad range of the Court's
subject matter jurisdiction. Not only did the ECJ adjudicate
economic issues that form the core of the EEC Treaty, it also
considered issues of social policy and harmonization of laws which
must necessarily be considered to attain the ambitious goals of the
EEC.
The ECJ's decisions in 1990 provide important direction to both
businesses operating in Europe and to the Member States
themselves. The Court's antidumping cases show a strong
protective attitude with regard to Community industry; clarify how
antidumping duties will be applied to OEMs; and provide OEMs
with a clearer picture of the EEC policies that affect their pricing
and import plans. The ECJ's decisions on equal opportunity in
employment clarify the EEC's provisions on this matter, and will
provide the framework for reform of Member States' policies
regarding retirement benefits and equal opportunity in general.
170. Ministere Public v. Guy Blanguemon, [1990] 2 Comm. Mkt. LR. 340.
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The issue of harmonization of laws between the Member States
and the EEC creates a thread underlying each of the ECY's
decisions. It is likely that this function will remain one of the
ECY's most important in order to achieve the EEC Treaty's
objectives of free movement of goods, services, and workers and
free development of undistorted competition.
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